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INTRODUCTION
My role at this symposium is to provide a brief overview of the
three-judge court's decision in McConnell v. FEC,' review the opinions,
piece together what the court actually decided, and see how the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 2 now stands. I will
try to do that briefly, while giving a few general comments about what
the court's opinions tell us about the state of campaign finance law
today. As a preliminary matter, the three-judge court's opinions pro-
vide us with two radically different world views-almost two different
intellectual universes-for thinking about campaign finance law.
In one world view, embraced enthusiastically by Judge Henderson
and occasionally by Judge Leon, campaign finance is the domain of
pure speech and core political association. The speech in campaign
contributions and spending creates few dangers for the political
process, and to the extent that it does, those dangers must be toler-
ated for the protection of speech and association. In this conceptual
universe, campaign finance regulation is a threat to constitutional
values. In order to sustain legislation that restricts campaign finance
practices, Congress must meet a very high standard of proof. The
government must present considerable evidence that such legislation
is strictly necessary to deal with any of the corruption dangers that ar-
guably flow from campaign contributions and expenditures. More-
over, such legislation must be very precisely tailored to meet the pur-
ported dangers of unregulated campaign finances; the law must be
neither overbroad, nor-to use a word employed by some members
of the court that I had not seen before-can it be underbroad.'
In the other world view, embraced wholeheartedly by Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly and occasionally by Judge Leon, the focal point is the
Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (threejudge court), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003)
(mem.).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
3 See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (blasting BCRA's definition of "electioneering communication" provi-
sion for "underbreadth"); id. at 644 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (discussing and rejecting plaintiffs' "un-
derbreadth" challenge to the definition of electioneering communication).
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threat to electoral and governmental integrity posed by campaign
money. In this intellectual universe, the potential for corruption and
the threat to public confidence in government is central . In this
universe, corruption is defined to mean not quid pro quo deals 5 but
the opportunity for special access to lawmakers and the possibility of
undue influence over government.6 There is widespread evidence
that large unregulated contributions, particularly corporate and un-
ion treasury funds, give their donors special access to Congress and
the President and have an impact on governance.' In this universe,
any harm from the imposition of limits on very large donations to the
political parties or from barring the use of corporate and union
treasury funds to pay for preelection electioneering communications
is entirely speculative and pales in significance to the dangers of cor-
ruption in the absence of regulation. In this universe, Congress is en-
titled to considerable deference when it determines that campaign
finance practices generate the corruption-causing dangers that war-
rant regulation, and when it decides what form that regulation
should take.8 Moreover, rather than require that federal legislation
be precisely tailored, this approach accepts that "[i]n the area of
campaign finance regulation, congressional action has been largely
incremental and responsive to the most prevalent abuses or evasions
of existing law at particular points in time."9
These are the two world views that collided in this case, producing
a staggering 1637 paes in the slip opinion and 774 pages in West's
Federal Supplement 2d.1 In fairness to the three-judge court, these two
worlds have both been critical in shaping campaign finance law over
the last quarter-century and are deeply embedded in our jurispru-
dence. Both universes are well represented in the Supreme Court
today." Given the sharp divide in legal thinking in campaign finance,
it is not surprising that the three-judge court had a hard time with
4 Id. at 512-17 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 870-74 (Leon, J.).
5 See id. at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.) ("The record does not contain any evidence of bribery or
vote buying in exchange for the donations of nonfederal money.... ."); id. at 851-53 (Leon,J.).6
See id. at 481-512 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (discussing what corruption means in this context);
id. at 856-66 (Leon,J.) (describing the relationships between contributions and access).
7 See id. at 856 (Leon,J.).
8 See id. at 799 (Leon, J.) ("[O]ne point bears emphasizing: Congress is infinitely more fa-
miliar than this Court with the circumstances and practical ramifications surrounding federal
elections and campaign finance law.").
9 Id. at 433 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
10 This includes the 743 pages that report the opinions of the court in the principal McCon-
nell case, the 29-page additional opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordering the unsealing of cer-
tain documents in the record, and the 2-page final judgment and order.
11 Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ([C]ampaign money "is property; it is not speech"), with id. at 410-30 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (requiring the restrictions on contributions be subject to strict scrutiny and rejecting the
argument that concern about corruption can justify contribution limitations).
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this case. Indeed, the court's struggle may very well foreshadow a
similar conflict in the Supreme Court.
In McConnell v. FEC, the court was so divided that the three judges
issued four separate opinions. There is, first, the 83-page per curiam
opinion that was joined by just Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon. 12
That opinion consists of a long background section on federal cam-
paign finance law,' 3 a legislative history of BCRA, 14 a review of the
procedural history of the BCRA litigation,"5 a summary of the provi-
sions of BCRA, 16 very minimal findings of fact,1v and conclusions of
law concerning just a handful of relatively marginal issues.' The per
curiam opinion does not address either the soft money or issue advo-
cacy provisions that constitute the heart of BCRA.
Second, there is the 166-page opinion of Judge Henderson,' 9 who,
in her own words, found the statute "unconstitutional in virtually all
of its particulars., 20 -indeed, not only unconstitutional, but "perni-
cious. 2' According to Judge Henderson, BCRA "breaks faith with the
fundamental principle-understood by our nation's Founding Gen-
eration, inscribed in the First Amendment and repeatedly reaffirmed
by the United States Supreme Court-that 'debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' 22 She found consti-
tutional precisely one of the provisions of BCRA that was under at-
tack,2 although she found several claims not justiciable on standing
or ripeness grounds so that several sections of the statute emerged
12 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 183-266 (per curiam).
13 Id. at 188-201.
I1 Id. at 201-06.
15 Id. at 206-09.
16 Id. at 209-20.
17 Id. at 220-33. These consist largely of very terse identifications of the parties, id. at 220-27,
and some findings concerning both the need for, and the consequences of, the enhanced dis-
closure BCRA would require, id. at 227-33.
is Id. at 233-65. The per curiam dismissed challenges predicated on the free press (as dis-
tinguished from the free speech) provision of the First Amendment, id. at 233-36, and reviewed
and sustained most of the disclosure provisions of BCRA Section 201 without directly consider-
ing the section's new definition of "electioneering communication," id. at 236-49; sustained the
extension of the rules governing coordinated expenditures to include coordinated electioneer-
ing communications, id. at 249-50; found the challenge to Section 212's reporting requirement
for certain independent expenditures not ripe, id. at 250-52; considered the challenges to Sec-
tion 214's regulation of party-candidate coordinated expenditures, id. at 252-65; and upheld
Section 311's clarity standards for the identification of sponsors of election-related advertising,
id. at 265.
19 d. at 266-432 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
20 d. at 266.
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
23 Judge Henderson found that BCRA Section 323(e), which prohibits any federal candidate
or officeholder from soliciting, receiving, or transferring nonfederal funds-e.g., soft money-
"in connection with" a federal, state, or local election, subject to certain exceptions, is constitu-
tional. Id. at 417-22.
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from her opinion unscathed even if not exactly validated. 24  These
provisions aside, Judge Henderson voted to invalidate all the major
provisions of BCRA,2 "' including nearly all of the prohibitions on soft
money26 and all provisions dealing with "electioneering communica-
tion."
Weighing in at 324 pages, 8 judge Kollar-Kotelly's principal opin-
ion29 is by far the longest opinion in the case. Judge Kollar-Kotelly
exhibited great deference to Congress's power to protect the integrity
of federal elections and great respect for Congress's ability to act in-
crementally and through evolutionary change. ° She would have up-
held all but three of the challenged provisions of BCRA3 although
she, like her colleagues, would have dismissed some of the claims as
not justiciable.2
The fourth and final opinion was written by Judge Leon. At a
mere 163 pages,3 Judge Leon's is the briefest of the three signed
24 See id. at 426-49 (finding as not ripe the challenges to BCRA's Section 305, which imposes
a "stand by your ad" requirement as a condition for eligibility for the "lowest unit" broadcast
charge benefit the Federal Communications Act provides federal candidates); id. at 429-432
(finding as lacking standing the plaintiffs who filed challenges to the sections of BCRA raising
the hard money limits and providing for increases in the otherwise applicable contribution-to-
candidate and coordinated expenditure limits if the candidate's opponent spends a "personal
funds amount" over a certain sum).
25 Like the per curiam, Judge Henderson also wrote at length concerning the history of
campaign finance regulation, id. at 271-81; BCRA's provisions, id. at 281-95; and the procedural
history of the case, id. at 266 n.1, 266-70, 295-96. Making it "clear" that she did not join in the
per curiam's statement of the facts, id. at 297 n.55, and that she believed that the factual find-
ings in the separate opinions ofJudges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon were replete with errors, id., she
also included extensive findings of facts, id. at 296-356.
26 Id. at 388-422.
7 Id. at 360-81.
28 Id. at 432-756 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This opinion includes a 3
7
-page "appendix" analyzing
some of the expert reports-and the challenges to those expert reports--concerning issue ad-
vocacy and the impact of BCRA's electioneering communication provisions on political adver-
tising. Id. at 719-56.
9 judge Kollar-Kotelly also published a 29-page opinion as part of her order unsealing cer-
tain documents in the case.
30 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 434-35 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
31 Judge Kollar-Kotelly joined her colleagues in finding unconstitutional BCRA Section 213,
which would preclude a political party from making both independent and coordinated expen-
ditures on behalf of a candidate once the party has nominated a candidate, id. at 650-51; BCRA
Section 318, which prohibits minors from making campaign contributions, id. at 717-18; and
BCRA Section 504, which requires broadcast licensees to collect and disclose records of any re-
quest to purchase broadcast time that is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate
for federal office or that relates to any political matter of national importance, id. at 718. In
addition, Judge Kollar-Kotelly joined the per curiam opinion's determination that the portion
of BCRA Section 201 that treats a person who has executed a contract to make an expenditure
as actually having made the expenditure is unconstitutional. Id. at 242.
3 See id. at 716 (finding that challenges to the stand by your ad, increased hard money lim-
its, and millionaire provisions were not justiciable).
33 Id. at 756-919 (Leon,J.).
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
opinions, but with respect to most issues it was the pivotal one be-
cause Judge Leon was the median voter on the three-judge panel.
Judge Leon joined with Judge Henderson in striking down most of
BCRA's proscriptions on political party soft money and in invalidat-
ing BCRA's primary effort to expand the regulation of issue advo-34
cacy. Yet, he voted to save a key part of the soft money restriction
and, joined by Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who would have upheld all of the
soft money regulations, that became the ruling of the court.
35 Simi-
larly, he voted to uphold a modified version of BCRA's backup defini-
tion of electioneering communication and, with Judge Kollar-Kotelly
joining him on this point, that resulted in the court's validation of
the modified backup definition.36
Although Judge Leon frequently joined Judge Henderson in re-
sult, he often broke with her reasoning. Thus, Judge Leon rejected
Judge Henderson's determination that soft money regulation must
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and instead agreed with Judge
Kollar-Kotelly that a restriction on soft money need be only "closely
drawn" to pass constitutional muster, which, he noted, is "a standard
of review somewhat less rigorous than strict scrutiny."3 7 Judge Leon,
however, concluded that many of BCRA's key soft money provisions
did not satisfy even his less restrictive standard. Similarly,Judge Leon
disagreed with Judge Henderson's conclusion that the "express advo-
cacy" standard for defining electioneering communication is consti-
tutionally mandated and instead concurred with Judge Kollar-Kotelly
that Congress could adopt a more expansive definition that did not
meet the "magic words" test of Buckley v. Valeo.38 However, Judge
Leon still agreed with Judge Henderson that Congress's primary
definition of electioneering communication was unconstitutionally
overbroad.
Judge Leon took an unusually creative approach to the judicial
role. He literally rewrote the two key sections of the statute in order
to make them comply with his constitutional analysis. 9 With respect
to soft money, Congress had provided for a complete ban on national
34 Id. at 758-73, 777-80, 790-91, 792-99.
35 Id. at 773-77, 780-90, 792.
36 Id. at 799-803.
37 Id. at 761.
38 Compare id. at 360-74 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that express advocacy test is constitutionally mandated), with id. at 594 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (concluding that express electoral advocacy is not a constitutional requirement), and
id. at 793 (Leon, J.) ("[T]he Supreme Court never intended the so-called express advocacy test
to be a constitutional rule of law limiting the power of Congress to regulate expenditures for
certain uncoordinated advocacy that directly affects federal elections, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of these ['magic'] words."). For the source of the "magic words" test, see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976).
39 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 773-77, 802-03 (Leon,J.).
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party soft money and a more limited requirement that state and local
political parties use only hard money to pay for four statutorily de-
fined federal election activities. Judge Leon-and, thus, the court-
held that the complete ban on national party soft money was over-
broad but, looking to the restriction on state parties, he picked out
one of the four defined federal election activities, narrowed the regu-
lation of national party activities to a ban on national party use of soft
money for that activity, and, as so narrowed by him, upheld the soft
money ban. Similarly, Congress provided two alternative definitions
of electioneering communication. Again, Judge Leon writing as the
court rejected the primary definition and then rewrote the backup
definition by deleting a key clause, and, as so rewritten, upheld the
backup definition.
The two central themes of Judge Leon's opinion, and thus of the
three-judge court, are that Congress has broad authority to regulate
the funding of communications, by both parties and nonparty cam-
paign participants, that promote or oppose federal candidates but
that Congress may not otherwise regulate political party finances. He
found that communications that promote or oppose clearly identified
candidates for federal office, even if they do not use the magic words
of express advocacy, have a direct effect on federal elections, and
thus may be regulated. On the other hand, building on an extremely
positive evaluation of the role of political parties in our democratic
system, ° Judge Leon was quite hostile to the regulation of the money
funding party programs that do not directly involve public communi-
cations that promote or oppose federal candidates, even though
these activities may have an effect on federal elections.4'
Two more preliminary facts are worth noting. First, not only was
the three-judge court deeply divided in its legal analysis, but the court
also failed completely to reach agreement on findings of facts. The
per curiam's findings come to a mere dozen pages, and Judge Hen-
derson did not even join those. The three judges, in their separate
opinions, each made extensive, but different, findings of facts. To-
gether, the three sets of findings amount to almost 320 pages.42 Al-
though some findings were common to two, and very rarely, three
judges, the enormous fragmentation of the findings effectively de-
prives the Supreme Court of any benefit it might have gotten from
the lower court's review of the record. Second, although five months
40 See id. at 759, 820-21 ("Our national political structure is firmly anchored by our two major
parties. The role those national parties play.., is critical to the stability our political system has
enjoyed over the past 200 years.").
41 Id. at 758-92.
42 See id. at 296-356 (findings of Henderson,J.); id. at 438-590 (findings of Kollar-Kotelly, J.);
id. at 813-919 (findings of Leon, J.).
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passed between argument and decision and the three judges devoted
more than 750 pages to their work, the result is distressingly sloppy.
Not only does the decision of the court have to be pieced together,
opinion by opinion, by appraising the determinations of individual
judges with respect to specific claims, but, with respect to two sections
of BCRA, it is very difficult to determine exactly what the court as a
whole actually decided. Let us hope that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion is not only shorter, but also clearer.
I. MCCONNELL AND BCRA's SOFT MONEY PROVISIONS
A. BCRA 's Soft Money Provisions
Title I of BCRA provides for the regulation of political party soft
money. Strikingly, BCRA actually uses the term "soft money"43 which
previously had been considered a bit of insider jargon and not a for-
mal legal category. 4  As all election law cognoscenti know, "soft
money" is the term for money that is used in federal campaigns that
is not subject to the requirements of federal law-specifically, the dis-
closure requirements, the dollar limitations on contributions, and the
prohibition on the use of corporate and union treasury funds. Prior
to BCRA, soft money was exempt from federal regulation on the the-
ory that it does not involve contributions to federal candidates, to
parties for contributions to or coordinated expenditures with federal
candidates, or independent expenditures expressly advocating the
election or defeat of federal candidates. Those activities must be
funded with money that complies with federal law, also known as
"hard money." Soft money was used by the political parties to sup-
port generic party activities; so-called mixed activities, such as voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, that support state and local as
well as federal candidates; and spending on communications support-
ing or opposing candidates but not using words of express advocacy.
The Federal Election Commission ("FEC") had held that political
party committees could use money that does not comply with the re-
quirements, limitations, and prohibitions of federal campaign law-
43 See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 ("regulating soft money of political
parties").
44 Unlike Congress, the members of the McConnell panel appeared to be somewhat squeam-
ish about the "soft money" term. All four opinions preferred to characterize BCRA's soft money
title as the regulation of "nonfederal funds." See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 184, 187-88 (per
curiam) (listing "soft money" as an example of nonfederal funds); id. at 279 n.30 (Henderson,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]his opinion generally uses
the terms 'federal funds' and 'nonfederal funds' in lieu of 'hard money' and 'soft money.'"); id.
at 439, 653 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (noting "soft money" as an alternate name for nonfederal
money); id. at 758 (Leon, J.) (listing "soft money" as an example of nonfederal funds in the
same way the per curiam opinion does).
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that is, soft money-to pay for some significant portion of these ac-
tivities.45
Title I of BCRA adds six distinct regulations of soft money to Sec-
tion 323 of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"). The first,
Section 323(a), prohibits the national parties from dealing in soft
money. Specifically, it prohibits the national political party commit-
tees from soliciting, receiving, transferring, spending, or directing to
another person or committee any funds that do not comply with fed-
eral campaign law. Next, Section 323(b) bans state and local political
parties from using soft money contributions for something defined by
FECA Section 301 (20) (A) as "Federal election activity." This consists
of (i) voter registration activities within 120 days before a regularly
scheduled election for federal office; (ii) voter identification, get-out-
the-vote activity, or generic campaign activity conducted in connec-
tion with an election in which a candidate for federal office appears
on the ballot; (iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office which promotes or opposes
that candidate, even if it does use the magic words of express advo-
cacy; and (iv) services provided by party staffers who spend more than
25 percent of their time working in connection with a federal elec-
tion. Third, Section 323(c) requires that the expenses political par-
ties incur in raising the funds that will pay for federal election activi-
ties must be paid from hard money. Fourth, Section 323(d) prohibits
political parties from soliciting funds for or donating funds to Section
501 (c) organizations that make expenditures in connection with fed-
eral elections or to Section 527 organizations.4' The provision deals
with the fact that the parties have at times raised money for, or di-
rected money to, these entities, which have then used the funds to aid
party candidates without complying with FECA's requirements and
restrictions. Fifth, Section 323(e) prohibits federal candidates and
officeholders from soliciting, receiving, spending, transferring, or di-
recting soft money in connection with any election for federal, state,
or local office. Finally, Section 323(f) prohibits state and local can-
didates from spending soft money on electioneering communications
45 See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. §§ 106.5, 106.6 (2003) (providing for allocation between federal and
state election activities); FEC Adv. Op. 1978-10, available at
http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/780010.html (allowing state party committees to use soft
money for nonfederal share of mixed federal-nonfederal activities); FEC Adv. Op. 1979-17,
available at http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/790017.html (allowing national party commit-
tees to use soft money for nonfederal portion of mixed federal-nonfederal activities); FEC Adv.
Op. 1995-25, available at http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/950025.html (allowing parties to
use soft money for a portion of costs of issue advocacy).
46 Section 501(c) and Section 527-the sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code-
organizations are not-for-profits that participate in electoral politics.
47 Federal officeholders running for state office may solicit, accept, and spend soft money as
part of their state campaigns provided they comply with applicable state laws.
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that support or oppose federal candidates even if these fall short of
express advocacy.
B. The Decision
How did these six provisions fare in the threejudge court's deci-
sion in McConnell? The short answer is: one provision was completely
invalidated; one provision was entirely sustained; one provision was
largely sustained, possibly even entirely sustained, although it is also
possible that part of it was invalidated; two provisions were sustained
in part and invalidated in larger part; and one provision did not re-
ceive conclusive treatment at all although apparently it survived at
least in part.
1. 323(a): National Party Soft Money
The complete ban on national party soft money was, to a consid-
erable degree, invalidated. Instead, as a result of Judge Leon's opin-
ion, it was converted into a ban on the national parties' use of soft
money only on expenditures for public communications that pro-
mote or oppose clearly identified candidates for federal office. Judge
Henderson would have invalidated the entire measure; Judge Kollar-
Kotelly would have upheld the entire measure. Judge Leon agreed
with Judge Kollar-Kotelly that as the soft money restrictions affect the
sources and amounts of contributions to parties, not the amounts and
purposes of party expenditures, the standard of review is the standard
the Supreme Court has used in other contributions cases-whether
the provision is "closely drawn" to prevent corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption. 48 He thus disagreed with Judge Henderson's
view that as the soft money restrictions do not apply to contributions
to candidates, the standard of review ought to be strict judicial scru-
tiny. 9
Judge Leon determined that national party expenditures on
communications that promote or oppose federal candidates "directly
affect federal elections," even when they avoid the "magic words" of
express advocacy.50 As a result, the contributions to the parties from
wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions that are used to fund
these communications raise precisely the dangers of corruption and
appearance of corruption that the Supreme Court has indicated can
48 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (Leon, J.).
49 See id. at 389-94 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Henderson relied heavily on Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981), which held that a restriction on contributions to a committee that engaged in ex-
penditures in connection with a ballot proposition campaign is subject to strict scrutiny.
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 763 (Leon,J.).
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justify restrictions on contributions. 1 But he concluded that the re-
quirement that the national political parties fund all their activities
with hard money went too far. Judge Leon noted that many national
party activities, such as the support of state and local candidates in off
year elections, 2 have no bearing on federal elections. Furthermore,
he determined that party spending on mixed activities, such as get-
out-the-vote drives in connection with an election in which both fed-
eral and state candidates are on the ballot "at the most indirectly af-
fect federal elections."53 As much of the benefit from these expendi-
tures goes to nonfederal candidates, he concluded there was
insufficient evidence to show that contributions funding these activi-
ties raise a danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption of
federal candidates sufficient to justify the hard money requirement.
So, Judge Leon in effect rewrote Section 323(a), lifting one, but only
one, of the four subsections in the definition of federal election activ-
ity in Section 301(20) (A), which had been intended to define the
scope of the soft money ban for state and local parties; importing it
into Section 323(a); and then saving that part of Section 323(a), but
only that part, which he had just placed there.
2. Section 323(b): State and Local Party Soft Money
Judge Leon, and thus the court, took the same approach to state
and local party soft money. Once again, he concluded that public
communications that clearly promote or oppose a federal candidate,
even if they avoid the magic words of express advocacy, have a direct
bearing on federal elections; that federal candidates are likely to be
aware of and grateful for donations that fund such communications
that benefit them; and that the public is likely to perceive "that the
special access and influence it believes are accorded to these donors
is in gratitude for that assistance."54 As a result, he upheld the ban on
use of soft money to pay for state and local party public communica-
tions in support of or opposition to clearly identified federal candi-
dates.
But Judge Leon held unconstitutional the requirement that state
and local parties use only hard money to pay for the other federal
election activities, that is, voter registration activities within four
months of an election; voter mobilization and generic party activities
in connection with an election in which a federal candidate is on the
ballot, and the payment of the costs of party staff who devote a quar-
51 Id. at 763-68.
5 Id. at 768.
53 Id. at 769.
54 Id. at 786.
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ter or more of their time to federal candidates. These were mixed ac-
tivities that plainly have some bearing on federal elections. Indeed,
the FEC has long regulated state and local party spending on federal
election activities, and has required that these activities be funded
with a mix of hard and soft money. Judge Leon, however, concluded
that because much of the benefit of these activities is enjoyed by state
and local candidates, federal candidates are unlikely to feel indebted
to the soft money donors who contribute to these activities, and the
public is unlikely to perceive this as a source of corruption." As a re-
sult, Congress cannot limit the use of soft money for these activities.
Finding insufficient evidence that funds used for state and local
party federal election activities create a danger of the corruption, or
appearance of corruption, of federal candidates, Judge Henderson
voted to invalidate the state and local party soft money ban. 6 Con-
versely, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found there was sufficient evidence that
contributions for these activities raise the specter of undue influence
and loss of public trust, and would have sustained all of them. Con-
sequently, Judge Leon's differentiation among the various statutorily
defined federal election activities-his finding that expenditures on
public communications supporting or opposing clearly identified
federal candidates are intimately connected with federal elections
and present the danger of corruption but that expenditures on voter
registration, voter mobilization, and party administrative overhead
that support both federal and state candidates are not sufficiently
linked to federal elections as to present a danger of corruption or the
appearance of corruption-became the opinion of the court.
3. Section 323(c): Party Fund-raising
It is actually quite difficult to determine how the McConnell court
dealt with this section of BCRA. Judge Henderson concluded that, as
this section built on the provision limiting state and local party fed-
eral election activities, it automatically fell with that provision.5
Judge Kollar-Kotelly observed that this section was not specifically
challenged by any plaintiff.59 Judge Leon's opinion does not appear
to mention it at all,6 and neither does the per curiam. Indeed, this
55 Id. at 778-80.
56 Id. at 388-422 (Henderson,J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part).
7 Id. at 651-716 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
Id. at 412 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 705 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
60 See id. at 790 (Leon, J.) (going directly from discussion of Section 323(b) to discussion of
Section 323(d) without mentioning Section 323(c)).
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subsection is not included in the per curiam's chart laying out the
court's rulings on a subsection by subsection basis.'
One reading of the court's action is that with one negative vote
and two silences, Section 323(c)'s restriction on national, state, and
local party fund raising survived unscathed. On the other hand,
given that Judge Leon joined Judge Henderson in holding unconsti-
tutional three of the four elements of the statutory definition of
"Federal election activity," it is difficult to see how a statutory subsec-
tion premised on the statutory definition of "Federal election activity"
could survive. By the logic of Judge Leon's treatment of Sections
323(a), 323(b), and 301(20), Section 323(c) should survive only to
the extent that it requires expenses incurred raising money to pay for
public communications that promote or oppose federal candidates to
be paid exclusively from hard money. Since, as a result of Judge
Leon andJudge Henderson's determinations, the other "federal elec-
tion activities" could still be financed with soft money, presumably the
expenses parties incur to raise that soft money could be paid for with
soft money as well. To be sure, no one on the panel actually said this,
but it seems more consistent with the approach of the majority than a
complete validation of the section.
4. Section 323(d): Party Solicitation for and Donations to Tax-Exempt
Organizations
Judges Henderson and Leon combined, over the opposition of
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, to invalidate this section.2 Both judges in the
majority relied in part on the breadth of the statutory language, par-
ticularly the fact that the section precludes all party financial transfers
to tax-exempt organizations, whether or not the recipient organiza-
tion uses the funds to affect federal election activity.
63
5. Section 323(e): Fund-raising by Federal Candidates and Officeholders
All three judges agreed that the core of this section-the ban on
federal candidates and officeholders raising soft funds in connection
with any federal, state, or local election-is constitutional. This is the
only section of BCRA that all three members of the McConnell court
61 Id. at 187 (per curiam).
612 Compare id. at 412-17 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (invalidating section 323(d)), and id. at 790-91 (Leon, J.) (same), with id. at 705-07 (Kol-
lar-Kotelly, J.) (upholding section).
63
Judge Kollar-Kotelly found there was sufficient "evidence in this case and the record be-
fore Congress" of the role played by tax-exempt organizations in "circumventing FECA's contri-
bution restrictions," id. at 707, to justify the restriction on party solicitation for transfer to tax-
exempt organizations as a loophole closing measure.
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agreed is constitutional."' However, Judges Henderson and Leon
each thought that a part of the section was unconstitutional, although
they found different parts unconstitutional. As a result it is difficult
to determine what, if any, part of the section was held unconstitu-
tional.
In noting that this is the only section that all threejudges voted to
uphold, I am really pointing out that this is the one section that
Judge Henderson voted to uphold. Indeed, Judge Henderson found
that it withstood strict judicial scrutiny. The key to her vote here is
that this section, unlike the four previous provisions of Title I, regu-
lates only federal candidates and officeholders, not political party
committees or other political committees. Although she found "de-
fendants' generalized, anecdotal evidence" of corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption inadequate to sustain restrictions on political
parties or independent organizations, that evidence was enough to
support restrictions on federal candidates and officeholders since it is
"hardly a novel or implausible proposition that a federal candidate's
solicitation of large donations from wealthy individuals, corporations
and labor organizations... can raise an appearance of corruption.",
6
"[I]n severing the most direct link between the federal candidate and
the nonfederal donor ... section 323(e) can serve to prevent the ap-
pearance of corruption where it is the most acute."'' Moreover, by
leaving federal candidates and officeholders free to associate with
their parties in other significant ways-including hard money fund-
raising, attending party fund-raising events, and soft money fund-
raising for tax-exempt organizations-Section 323(e) "is no more re-
strictive of political speech than may be necessary to prevent appar-
ent corruption of the federal candidates and officeholders it regu-
lates.
67
Judge Henderson did vote to invalidate a small portion of this
subsection. Section 323(e) (1) (A) provides that a federal candidate
or official may not "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in
connection with an election for Federal office, including funds for any
Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations,
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of [FECA]."' As Judge
Henderson had voted to invalidate the BCRA provision defining
64 Id. at 417-22 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 707-08 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 791 (Leon,J.).
Id. at 420 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
SId. at 421.
67 Id. at 422.
68 BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §101, 116 Stat. 81, 84 (emphasis added).
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"Federal election activity," she also voted to strike this phrase from
Section 323(e) (1).69
Judge Leon voted to uphold the core ban on federal candidates
and officeholders raising soft funds in connection with any election
and he also voted to uphold the ban on receiving soft funds in con-
nection with the federal election activity defined in Section
301 (20) (A), including this time the funds for such mixed activities as
voter registration, voter mobilization, and party committee staff sala-
ries. 70 But then he dissented from the prohibition on a federal can-
didate or officeholder soliciting soft funds on behalf of his national
party. According to Judge Leon, this threatens fund-raising activity
which "is fundamental to the successful operation of the major na-
tional parties, 7' and is unjustified by the anti-corruption goal since
most nonfederal funds are used by the parties for activities that do
not directly affect federal elections.72 As a result, Judge Leon would
affirm a complete ban on federal candidates and officials receiving soft
money, but would enable them to solicit soft money for those activities
of the national parties that do not directly affect federal elections.
It is not completely clear how the efforts of Judge Henderson
73
and Judge Leon to knock out part of Section 323(e) fit together or
how they affect the outcome. As Judge Leon voted with Judge Kollar-
Kotelly to uphold the prohibition on federal candidates and office-
holders receiving, directing, or transferring nonfederal funds in con-
nection with any election, that portion of the statute was upheld not-
withstanding Judge Henderson's disagreement. But Judge Leon's
vote to invalidate that portion of the statute that would ban federal
candidates and officeholders from soliciting funds when combined
with Judge Henderson's vote to strike completely the reference to
"funds for any Federal election activity" from Section 323(e) appears
to mean that on this point Judge Leon actually prevailed, even
though both Judge Leon and the per curiam state that he is in dissent
on this point
4
Again, as with Section 323 (e), we can only hope that the Supreme
Court will be clearer, and more accurate, than the members of the
three-judge court in telling us what they have decided.
69 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 417 n.173 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
70 Id. at 791 & n.95 (Leon,J.).
71 Id. at 792.
72 Id.
73 Oddly, neither the per curiam opinion norJudge Leon's opinion actually acknowledged
thatJudge Henderson voted to invalidate part of Section 323(e). Both opinions stated that she
voted to uphold section 323(e) in its entirety, even though she did not. See id. at 184, 187 (per
curiam opinion); id. at 791 (Leon,J.).
74 Id. at 184 (per curiam); id. at 791 (Leon,J.).
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6. Section 323(f): Restrictions on State Candidates
Judges Kollar-Kotelly7' and Leon 76 agreed that this provision,
which requires that when state candidates spend money on public
communications that support or oppose clearly identified candidates
for federal office they must use hard money, is constitutional. So,
Section 323(f) is sustained. Judge Henderson would have thrown it
out as inseverable from the rest of the soft money ban, which she had
voted to invalidate.
So, to recap on soft money, under the court's ruling, Section
323(a), which was the blanket ban on national parties having any-
thing to do with soft money, would apply only to national party ex-
penditures on public communications that promote or oppose clearly
identified candidates for federal office-in other words, party issue
ads. The rest of the subsection was invalidated. Similarly, the court
voted to narrow Section 323(b), which requires that state and local
parties use only hard money for four defined federal election activi-
ties, to apply just to party issue ads. It is difficult to determine what
the court decided about Section 323(c)'s requirement that parties
use only hard money to pay their fund-raising expenses; either it
emerged unscathed or the court limited it to fund-raising for elec-
tioneering ads. Section 323(d) restricting political party support for
tax-exempt organizations was held unconstitutional in its entirety.
Section 323(e) was upheld almost in its entirety; however, it appears
that as a result of the interplay of the Henderson and Leon opinions,
the court ruled that it may not be applied to prevent federal candi-
dates and officeholders from soliciting soft money for the nonfederal
activities of their parties. Finally, Section 323 (f) was upheld in its en-
tirety.
C. Analysis
The three-judge court awarded a very significant half-a-loaf to soft
money reform. Although the court upheld only the bans on federal
candidate and officeholder fund raising and on party use of soft
money for candidate advocacy, these are probably the campaign ac-
tivities that have been the greatest source of public concern. Candi-
date advocacy is the number one use of party soft money.17 As Judge
75 Id. at 708 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
76 Id. at 792 (Leon,J.).
77 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2002) (pointing out that in 2000 parties
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Leon suggested, this is the most direct form of party aid to candidates
and the use of large individual donations and corporate and union
treasury funds to pay for party advocacy concerning candidates is the
most blatant evasion of campaign finance law. By the same token,
some supporters, as well as opponents, of reform had been troubled
by the possibility that a general limit on soft money would curtail
spending on voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, which have
been important party programs for increasing citizen participation.
Indeed, the Levin Amendment relaxes some of BCRA's soft money
limitations to permit parties to raise additional funds for voter mobi-
lization activities. By requiring that only hard money be used for
party advocacy of candidates, but permitting the unrestricted use of
soft money for voter registration, voter mobilization, and generic
party activities, the court may have struck a balance that many re-
formers could be comfortable with. It is also significant that two of
the three members of the court found the standard of review of limi-
tations on contributions to political parties is not strict scrutiny but
the less restrictive review employed when contributions to candidates
are at issue. This also facilitates regulation of party campaign finance
practices.
On the other hand, the court's ruling also gave at least half-a-loaf
to the opponents of reform. Candidate advocacy may be the single
largest use of soft money, but it accounts for less than half of soft-
money-funded party spending. The decision would allow the flow of
most soft funds into the parties unabated. Moreover, although can-
didate advocacy may be the most blatant use of soft money, funds
from large donors, corporations, and unions are also used to pay for
other party activities. Voter registration and mobilization are surely
desirable activities but large private donations that fund these pro-
grams can be a source of donor influence with parties and candi-
dates. In asserting that he found it implausible that federal candi-
dates and officeholders would feel grateful to donors who provide
substantial sums to pay for activities that benefit federal and nonfed-
eral candidates simultaneously, Judge Leon appeared to be conflating
the concept of mixed activities with the notion of indirect influence.
If spending on voter registration and get-out-the-vote benefits candi-
dates, it is hard to see why the "federal candidate's sense of indebted-
ness"18 is attenuated just because the spending benefits nonfederal
candidates, too.
Moreover, Judge Leon's invalidation of three of the four defined
state party election activities, and his unwillingness to apply the na-
spent $162 million on "electioneering issue ads" and that issue ads accounted for 37.8% of all
party soft money spent in the 1999-2000 election cycle).
78 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (Leon,J.)
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
tional party soft money ban to these activities, should be particularly
troubling to reformers precisely because he applied a lower standard
of review. Judge Leon concluded that there was not enough evidence
that large donations for voter registration, voter mobilization, or
party administrative costs are a source of undue influence over fed-
eral officeholders to meet even the lower "closely drawn" standard.
Indeed, one implication of the Henderson-Leon decision is that
the FEC's pre-BCRA regulations of soft money might also have been
unconstitutional. For many years prior to BCRA's enactment, the
FEC had subjected national and state party funding of mixed federal-
state activities to disclosure and allocation requirements so that some
significant portion of party spending on these programs had to be
hard money funded. In fact, the FEC regulations required that most
national party spending on mixed activities like voter registration,
get-out-the-vote, generic communications, and administrative over-
head had to be hard money funded; although, the FEC's allocation
formulae tended to allow state parties to finance a larger share of
these activities with soft money. If Judges Henderson and Leon are
right that these expenditures are unlikely to have a corrupting effect
on federal candidates or a demoralizing effect on public opinion-or
that the defendants have failed to produce enough evidence of cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption-then the pre-existing allo-
cation and disclosure requirements are arguably unconstitutional,
too. To be sure, they do not say this. But if there is no evidence that
federal candidates are indebted to the donors who finance mixed
programs and if, as Judge Leon contends, the spreading of the bene-
fits of these programs across a range of federal and nonfederal can-
didates dilutes even further the danger of corruption, then it is un-
clear how the FEC could require that these programs be even
partially hard money funded.
II. MCCONNELL AND THE REGULATION OF ISSUE ADVOCACY
A. BCRA and Electioneering Communications
The other key provision of BCRA creates and regulates a new
category of federal campaign activity known as "electioneering com-
munication" in order to deal with the problem of so-called issue ad-
vocacy. As we all know, in Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court sus-
tained FECA's requirement that persons making independent
expenditures in federal elections over a threshold amount must
comply with federal reporting and disclosure rules. In so doing, the
Court recognized that the statutory term "expenditure," when ap-
plied to the activities of individuals and groups other than candidates
and their political committees, raised dangers of vagueness and over-
breadth; it "could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in
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issue discussion. "79 To avoid the First Amendment problem, the
Court construed the statute to "reach only funds used for communi-
cations that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate. 8 0 In a footnote, the Court indicated this con-
struction would restrict the statute "to communications containing
express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' 8 ' These have since become notorious as
the "magic words" of "express advocacy." A decade later, in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL") 82 the Court determined
that the same express advocacy standard would be read into the fed-
eral statutory ban on the use of corporate and union treasury funds
to pay for expenditures in connection with federal election cam-
paigns.
Under Buckley and MCFL, only advertisements that expressly advo-
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate are
subject to FECA. Advertisements that promote or oppose a federal
candidate but avoid the "magic words" of express advocacy are con-
sidered to be "issue advocacy," whether or not they actually include
the discussion of any issues. Such issue advocacy is exempt from fed-
eral regulation: the sponsors of issue ads need not disclose the
sources of their funding and corporations and unions can spend
treasury funds to pay for such ads. By one widely accepted estimate,
nearly $500 million was spent on unregulated issue advocacy advertis-
ing in the 2000 election cycle.83 BCRA addresses this situation by de-
fining a new form of expenditure called "electioneering communica-
tion" and then plugging that term into both FECA's disclosure
requirement and the ban on corporate and union treasury funds in
federal elections.
Actually, fearful that the courts might be unsympathetic to its ef-
fort to expand the scope of regulable election speech, Congress did
something unusual. It adopted two definitions of electioneering
communication-a primary definition, and a backup definition that
would kick in if the primary definition were invalidated. The primary
definition has four parts. It defines an electioneering communica-
tion, subject to federal disclosure regulation and the ban on the use
of corporate and union treasury funds, as (i) a broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication that (ii) refers to a clearly identified candi-
79 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
80 Id. at 80.
81 Id. at 80 n.108, 44 n.52.
82 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
83 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.); id. at 879 (Leon,J.).
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date for federal office; (iii) is broadcast within sixty days of a general
election or thirty days of a primary; and (iv) is targeted on the candi-
date mentioned by being aired in the candidate's constituency.84 The
backup definition, which becomes law only in the event that the pri-
mary definition is tossed out by the courts, has three parts. First, like
the primary definition, it applies only to broadcast, cable, or satellite
communications. Second, the communication must promote or sup-
port, or oppose or attack, a candidate regardless of whether it uses
the magic words of express advocacy. Finally, the communication
must be "suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhorta-
tion to vote for or against a specific candidate.""
B. The Decision
The three-judge court, with Judge Leon again playing the decisive
role, invalidated the primary definition of electioneering communi-
cation but modified and then upheld the backup definition. In so
doing, the court-again, really just Judge Leon-deleted the last
element of the backup definition so the definition that resulted was
not only far broader then that the backup definition passed by Con-
gress, but also in some respects even broader than the primary defini-
tion, which the court invalidated as overbroad.
How did this occur? Once again, the opinions of Judges Hender-
son and Kollar-Kotelly are straight-forward. Judge Henderson con-
cluded the issue was entirely controlled by Buckley's express advocacy
test. In her view, Buckley made express advocacy a constitutional pre-
requisite for regulation of the communications of noncandidates 6
As both definitions of electioneering communication went beyond
express advocacy, they were unconstitutional. Judge Kollar-Kotelly,
by contrast, concluded that Buckl-y's express advocacy test was only "a
means of statutory construction"' that dealt with the "vague and sub-
jective terms associated with the provisions of FECA""s and "not a sub-
stantive rule of constitutional law.""9 Putting the express advocacy test
to one side, in her view the question is whether there is a constitu-
tional basis for regulating electioneering communication, and
84 BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-89. With the targeting requirement, an
ad attacking the McCain-Feingold bill is subject to regulation only if it is aired in McCain's state
when he is running for reelection, or in Feingold's state when he is running for reelection. The
targeting requirement also requires that the communication must be capable of being received
by 50,000 or more people in the constituency.
85 Id.
86 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 360-67 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
87 Id. at 597 (Kollar-Kotelly,j.)
88 Id. at 603.
8 Id. at 597.
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whether the statutory definition meets.First Amendment standards of
clarity and narrow tailoring. She concluded that issue advocacy ad-
vertisements broadcast during the sixty- and thirty-day preeelection
periods were virtually indistinguishable from express advocacy in
terms of their effect on elections, that the constitutional concerns jus-
tifying regulation of express advocacy equally justify regulation of
electioneering issue advocacy, and that some regulation of "election-
eering communication" is necessary to prevent the widespread eva-
sion of federal disclosure requirements and the ban on the use of
corporate and union treasury funds.9 She determined that the pri-
mary definition was not vague and, giving particular attention to the
sixty-/thirty-day test, that it was not overbroad, either.9'
With his colleagues so far apart, once again Judge Leon forced a
resolution somewhere between them, although, this time he landed
far closer to Judge Kollar-Kotelly. Judge Leon agreed with Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly that Buckley's express advocacy test was meant only to cure
the vagueness in the original FECA language, and was "never in-
tended ... to be a constitutional rule of law limiting the power of
Congress to regulate expenditures for certain uncoordinated advo-
cacy that directly affects federal elections .... He also agreed that
most of the issue advocacy that would be caught by the primary defi-
nition is in fact indistinguishable from express advocacy, that issue
advocacy is intended to and does have an impact on federal elections,
and that the concerns that justify the regulation of express advocacy
also justify the regulation of such issue advocacy.
However, Judge Leon also found that the primary definition
would capture a certain number of true issue ads, that is advertise-
ments that, even though they mention federal candidates and are
aired in the immediate preelection period, are primarily intended to
address legislative or other issues and not the impending election.
Looking to two controversial reports by outside experts that were part
of the record in the case, Judge Leon estimated that if BCRA's pri-
mary definition of electioneering communication had been applied
in the 1998 and 2000 elections, 14.7% and 17%, respectively, of the
ads it would have regulated would have been true issue ads.93 For
Judge Leon, that rendered the statute fatally overbroad.
Judge Leon then turned to the backup definition, which, unlike
the primary definition, does not include a temporal test. He con-
cluded that by eliminating the sixty-/thirty-day rule and focusing in-
stead on whether an ad supports or opposes a candidate, the primary
90 Id. at 594-616.
91 Id. at 616-650.
92 Id. at 793 (Leon,J.)
93 Id. at 798.
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definition eliminates the overbreadth problem. However, in his view,
the final clause in the backup definition, limiting "electioneering
communication" to messages that are "suggestive of no plausible
meaning other than an exhortation to vote," is unconstitutionally
vague since it would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a
speaker to determine with any certainty prior to airing an ad whether
it meets that requirement."94 To remedy the vagueness problem he
employed the "saving construction" of simply striking out the clause.95
As a result, he reduced the backup test to the two elements of (i) a
broadcast, cable, or satellite message, that (ii) supports or opposes a
candidate. As Judge Leon notes, this renders the definition of elec-
tioneering communication for purposes of the disclosure of commu-
nications by independent groups and the ban on corporate and un-
ion treasury funds quite similar to the definition of the national and
state political party "public communication" for which the use of soft
money is banned. 6  Although Judge Kollar-Kotelly "strongly be-
lieve [d]"97 the primary definition to be constitutional, she joined
without discussion Judge Leon's opinion regarding the backup defi-
nition,9 thereby making his opinion dispositive on this point.
C. Analysis
Although the court struck down BCRA's primary definition of
electioneering communication, this decision-including both the
Kollar-Kotelly and Leon opinions-is almost certainly the strongest
judicial statement ever that regulation of election-related communi-
cations that go beyond the magic words of express advocacy is consti-
tutional. Previously, the federal courts were nearly unanimous in
treating the express advocacy/magic words test as a constitutional re-
quirement.99 Only one court-the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Fur-
gatch -had suggested there was room for even modest regulation
beyond the magic words and Furgatch limited itself to a finding that
the advertisement before it, which lacked the magic words, was "sus-
ceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation
to vote .. .."101 This was the source of the limiting final clause in
94 Id. at 802.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 803.
97 Id. at 650 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L.
REv. 1751, 1755-60 (1999) (evaluating lower court decisions). For a more recent case taking
the same approach, see Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
100 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
101 Id. at 864.
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BCRA's backup definition. Indeed, Congress's reliance on Furgatch
in crafting the backup test suggests that some reform pessimists were
doubtful that the courts would ever uphold anything more restrictive
than Furgatch.10 2 So the opinions of Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon
that Buckley's express advocacy test is not constitutionally mandated
and a much broader test is constitutionally permissible are quite sig-
nificant.
Just as important is the court's finding that much of contemporary
issue advocacy is really electoral advocacy. Indeed, all three judges
acknowledged that the express advocacy/magic words test fails~utterly
to distinguish between election-related speech and nonelection-
related issue speech.10 3  And, after reviewing the record's extensive
evidence concerning issue advocacy, including the story boards of
many particular issue ads, both Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon
agreed that in many cases electioneering communication that takes
the form of issue advocacy is the functional equivalent of express ad-
vocacy. Consequently, they found that the voter information and an-
ticorruption rationales that justify the disclosure of the sources of the
funds used for express advocacy and the ban on the use of corporate
and union funds to pay for express advocacy also justify comparable
regulation of electioneering communications that do not use the
magic words. 10 4 For these judges, the question is not whether elec-
tioneering communication that does not use words of express advo-
cacy can be regulated but only whether Congress wrote an election-
eering communication definition that is sufficiently clear and
narrowly tailored.
Although it is uncertain whether the panel's findings and reason-
ing will have any persuasive value with the Supreme Court, it should
be heartening to reform advocates that at least two of the three
judges who immersed themselves in the close review of specific issue
102 Before BCRA, the Furgatch standard had been adopted by the FEC in a regulation
defining express advocacy, but several courts invalidated that regulation, see, e.g., FEC v. Me.
Right to Life Comm., Inc., 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v.
FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting the new FEC regulation,
.encompass[ed] substantially more communication than is permissible pursuant to the statute,
as narrowed by the Supreme Court to avoid First Amendment overbreadth problems"); or
otherwise repudiated Furgatch, see, e.g., Fla. Right to Life, Inc. 238 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001);
Citizens for Responsible State Gov't PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that state regulation of independent campaign advocacy that goes beyond the
magic words violates the First Amendment); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d
1049 (4th Cir. 1997) (treating Furgatch as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent). But see
Crumpton v. Keisling, 982 P.2d 3 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Furgatch to Oregon disclosure
law enforceable by civil, but not criminal, sanctions).
10s McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 529, 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 874 (Leon,J.).
104 Id. at 599-645 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 793 (Leon,J.).
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ads were willing to conclude that these are electioneering communi-
cations that are the functional equivalent of express advocacy and
that they can be regulated to deal with the same dangers that express
advocacy poses. Moreover, although Judge Leon invalidated the
primary definition and upheld only the backup definition, due to his
excision of the backup definition's final clause, the result is quite ex-
pansive-possibly as broad if not broader than the primary definition.
The backup definition has no temporal limit. It could apply to ads
aired in February or March of an election year, or conceivably in the
year before, and not just in the September or October before the
election.
As Judge Leon noted, the consequence of his deletion of the final
clause from the backup definition was to convert that definition into
something very close to the "public communication" provision in the
soft money title's definition of party federal election activity.105 This
was the only part of the definition of federal election activity that
Judge Leon held could be applied to require state and local parties to
use hard money, and he then read it into the regulation of national
parties to require that national party spending on public communica-
tions that support or oppose federal candidates be hard money
funded. In upholding the public communication portion of the
party soft money ban, Judge Leon gave weight to the fact that "the
'speaker' running this type of advertisement is a national or state
party" since that "supports the defendants' contention that most of
the advertisements, referring to a candidate in this manner, will be
intended to promote or attack that particular candidate."'0 6 As he
explained:
A political party, as opposed to corporations and other nonparties, exists
to a large extent for the purpose of electing candidates of its party to of-
fice .... While not all party advertisements are intended to directly influ-
ence a federal election ... the presumptive electoralfocus [sic] of parties
suggests that party communications that do mention candidates are,
more likely than not, to have some impact on a federal election.
0 7
Judge Leon also explained that "political parties are sophisticated
participants in the election arena" and thus are "much more likely to
recognize the line between candidate advocacy and genuine issue ad-
vocacy. "'°8 Therefore, they are likely to avoid unintentionally subject-
ing themselves to regulation. In other words, the especially close ties
parties have to candidates and their expertise in election law justify
105 Compareid. at 773-77 (Leon,J.), and id. at 780-90, with id. at 799-803.
W, Id. at 786-87 (citing Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 620, 655-57 (2000)).
107 Id. at 787.
108 Id. at 788.
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treating all party communications that support or oppose candidates
as electioneering that must be funded with hard money.
But as a result of his editing of the backup definition, Judge Leon
applied the same definition of electioneering communications to
corporations, unions, and all individuals and interest groups. He ac-
knowledged that "the sophistication in electioneering communica-
tions of the parties being regulated is not equally applicable to the
backup definition."'' " That said, it is hard to see why if the applica-
tion of a fairly broad definition of public communication to the par-
ties is justified by their special ties to candidates and their political
sophistication, the very same definition can also be applied to organi-
zations that lack those ongoing institutional ties and expertise.
III. THE DECISION'S DISPOSITION OF BCRA's OTHER PROVISIONS
A. The Welistone Amendment
BCRA Sections 203 and 204 engage in an interesting two-step with
respect to the regulation of not-for-profit corporations. Section 203,
also known as the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment, applies the definition
of electioneering communication to the long-standing ban on the use
of corporate treasury funds in federal elections, and then provides an
exception for the communications of corporations organized under
Sections 501 (c) (4) and 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. In other
words, these political not-for-profit organizations can use treasury
funds to engage in electioneering communications and may do so
without complying with FECA's disclosure requirements. Section
204, also known as the Wellstone Amendment, then undoes much of
Section 203 by providing that the exception does not apply to a "tar-
geted communication"-that is a broadcast, cable, or television ad
which promotes or opposes a candidate and is aired to the candi-
date's constituency-by the otherwise protected not-for-profit.
Both Section 203 and Section 204 are shadowed by the Supreme
Court's decision in MCFL, which held that the ban on the use of cor-
porate treasury funds in federal elections could not constitutionally
be applied to organizations that were created for political, not busi-
ness, purposes; that do not have shareholders or other persons affili-
ated so as to have a claim on the corporation's assets or earnings; and
that do not accept contributions from business corporations." Many
campaign finance experts had assumed that MCL's exclusion of po-
litical corporations from the ban on the use of corporate treasury
funds means that something like Section 203's exclusion of the elec-
109 Id. at 803.
10 FEC v. MCFL, 479 U.S. 258, 264 (1986).
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tioneering communications of political not-for-profit corporations
from regulation is constitutionally mandated. As a result, Section
204's re-regulation of not-for-profits' electioneering communication
has been seen as constitutionally suspect.
Section 204, however, survived the three-judge court. Unsurpris-
ingly, Judge Henderson voted to throw out the provision along with
BCRA's regulation of electioneering communications generally."'
Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that not all political not-for-profits would
qualify for MCFL's protection and thus subjecting the not-for-profits
to regulation is not unconstitutional on its face, although a not-for-
profit corporation that qualified for MCFL treatment would be consti-
tutionally entitled to exemption.12  Judge Leon agreed with Judge
Henderson that it would be unconstitutional to apply Section 204 to
an MCFL corporation, but concurred with Judge Kollar-Kotelly that
Section 204 is constitutional as applied to not-for-profit corporations
that do not qualify for MCFL status."13 The distinction between the
Kollar-Kotelly and Leon positions is quite nuanced-almost evanes-
cent. Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected the plaintiffs' facial challenge, but
indicated that an MCFL exception is likely to be read into the statute
to exclude MCFL-qualifying corporations in an appropriate as-applied
case. Judge Leon said that the statute is unconstitutional as applied
to MClL-qualifying corporations, but constitutional as applied to
non-MCFL-qualifying corporations. I think the effect is the same.
B. Other Disclosure Requirements
Section 201 imposes new disclosure provisions with respect to ex-
penditures in excess of $10,000 on electioneering communications.
This was generally sustained by the per curiam " 4 except for one sub-
part, Section 201(5), which requires the disclosure of contracts to
make disbursements, in other words, plans for future independent
expenditures."5 As Judge Henderson would have invalidated the en-
tire disclosure section, all three judges agreed that the advance dis-
closure provision was unconstitutional.
I McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
11 Id. at 639-43 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the Supreme Court in
MCFL did not invalidate the federal ban on the use of corporate treasury funds to pay for inde-
pendent expenditures but simply found that MC1 and similar corporations were entitled to an
exception.
"1 Id. at 803-05 (Leon,J.).
114 Id. at 237-49 (per curiam).
11 Id. at 237-42.
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C. Coordinated Expenditures for Electioneering Communications
as Contributions
For most regulatory purposes, FECA treats coordinated expendi-
tures as equivalent to contributions to the candidate with whom the
expenditure is coordinated. Building on the new definition of "elec-
tioneering communication," Section 202 of BCRA provides that ex-
penditures for electioneering communications that are coordinated
with a candidate are also to be treated as contributions to the candi-
date with whom they are coordinated. The per curiam upheld this
overJudge Henderson's dissent.
1 6
D. Coordinated and Independent Party Expenditures
The three-judge court displayed an unusual bit of unanimity and
dealt reform a rare unqualified setback when all three judges voted to
invalidate BCRA Section 213, which provides that once a party nomi-
nates a candidate, the party can make either independent expendi-
tures on behalf of or coordinated expenditures with the candidate,
but not both. Section 213 is a response to the Supreme Court's 1996
decision in Colorado Republican V' Speaking through a plurality opin-
ion, Colorado Republican I rejected the argument that political parties
are incapable of making expenditures independent of their candi-
dates and that all party expenditures supporting or opposing a can-
didate must be deemed coordinated with the party's candidate. In-
stead, the plurality found that political parties, like other groups, are
capable of making independent expenditures; that the burden of
proving the expenditure is not independent is on the FEC; and that,
like the independent expenditures of all other campaign partici-
pants, party independent expenditures may not be subject to a dollar
limitation.
The Colorado Republican I decision makes some sense on its facts.
The case involved a state party expenditure on advertising aired very
early in an election year that criticized the likely nominee of the op-
posite party. The expenditure was incurred six months before the
party nominated its own candidate and was, in fact, not coordinated
with any of the party's contenders. But although Colorado Republican I
demonstrates that it is empirically possible for a party to engage in a
truly independent expenditure, in most situations party independent
expenditures seem implausible. Parties have institutionally close rela-
116 Compare id. at 216 (per curiam), with id. at 381-88 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
117 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) ("Colorado Republi-
can r).
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tionships with and commitments to their nominees which belie the
claim of independence. Indeed, in Colorado Republican I three justices
who concurred in the result and were necessary to the majority re-
ferred to the "practical identity of interests between the two entities
[parties and candidates] during an election""" while the two dissent-
ing justices found that "[a] party shares a unique relationship with
the candidate it sponsors because their political fates are inextricably
linked."" 9
In Section 213, Congress sought to limit Colorado Republican Ito its
facts, while preventing the evasion of FECA's dollar limitations on
party coordinated expenditures. 20 Section 213's provision that once
a party has nominated a candidate the party must thereafter choose
between coordinated and independent expenditures seems sensible
as once a party has nominated a candidate, the party and the candi-
date have the same goal-the candidate's election. Moreover, if a
party has also begun to coordinate expenditures with a candidate, it
is difficult to see how a party can also be independent of the candi-
date. The three-judge panel, however, disagreed, finding that Colo-
rado Republican I gives a political parties an unqualified right to make
independent expenditures on behalf of its candidates, even after it
has a nominee and has coordinated expenditures with the nomi-
nee. 2 ' All three judges voted to hold Section 213 unconstitutional.
E. Other Provisions
All three members of the court agreed, following the reasoning of
Judge Henderson, to dismiss for lack of standing or ripeness the chal-
lenges to (i) the increases in and indexation of FECA's hard money
limits; 2 2 (ii) the so-called "millionaire provisions," which allow candi-
dates who are being opposed by other candidates who spend defined
large sums of money out of their own pockets to raise contributions
in amounts greater than FECA ordinarily allows;2 3 and, (iii) the so-
Hs Id. at 630 (KennedyJ, concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and ScaliaJ.).
119 Id. at 648 (Stevens,J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
120 The limitation on party coordinated expenditures was upheld against constitutional attack
in FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ("Colorado Republi-
can I").
12 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 650 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 805-08 (Leon,J.).
1 See id. at 429-30 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 716 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring with Henderson,J.); id. at 186, 188 (per curiam).
Judge Leon did not address this issue but apparently concurred in Judge Henderson's finding
of nonjusticiability.
123 Id. at 431-32 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 716 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring with Henderson,J.); id. at 186, 188 (per curiam).Judge
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called stand-by-your-ad provision, which limits the availability of
broadcasting's lowest unit charge to federal candidates who either
don't attack their opponents or, if they do attack them, place in the
ad a statement clearly identifying the sponsor. 24 All three judges
agreed that BCRA's absolute ban on all political contributions by mi-
nors is unconstitutional, with Judges Henderson and Leon applying
strict scrutiny2 "' and Judge Kollar-Kotelly declining to decide what
level of review was appropriate since in her view the government had
failed to produce sufficient evidence of parents using minors to cir-
cumvent the limits on the parental contributions to justify the total
prohibition. 12 6 The decision once again demonstrates the conceptual
difference between voting and participating in campaign financing
since minors have no right to vote. Finally, all three judges agreed
that the provision requiring broadcast licensees to maintain and dis-
close records of al requests to purchase broadcast time concerning




The three-judge court decision was surprising in its substance as
well as in its length and delay. Prior to BCRA's enactment many ob-
servers had assumed that, given Buckley's express advocacy standard,
issue advocacy regulation would be constitutionally problematic but
that soft money control, except perhaps on the soft money used to
fund issue advocacy, would be easy to sustain since the soft money
rules limit contributions and the Supreme Court has been fairly def-
erential to contribution limits. 28 The three-judge court reached the
opposite result, crafting and upholding a fairly significant restriction
on issue advocacy while striking down all restrictions on party soft
money, except the ban on the use of soft money to fund party issue
advocacy. Given the extreme fragmentation within the three-judge
court and its failure to even find a common set of facts, let alone a
Leon did not address this issue but apparently concurred in Judge Henderson's finding of non-
justiciability.
124 Id. at 426-49 (Henderson, J); id. at 716 (Kollar-Kotelly,J., concurring with Henderson, J.);
id. at 186, 188 (per curiam).Judge Leon did not address this issue but apparently concurred in
Judge Henderson's finding of nonjusticiability.
125 Id. at 422-26 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 808-11 (Leon,J.).
126 Id. at 717-18 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
127 See id. at 381 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 718 (Kollar-Kotelly,J., concurring in opinion of Leon,J.); id. at 811-13 (Leon,J.).
128 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Constitutionality of a Soft Money Ban After Colorado Republican
II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195 (2002); Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional
Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24J. LEGIS. 179 (1998).
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shared rationale for its holdings, it is unclear whether its rulings will
have any persuasive effect at all with the Supreme Court. Still, for the
moment, the decision may give us a sense of the shape of the ques-
tions before the Court, if not the Court's ultimate decision.
With respect to issue advocacy, Buckley's express advocacy holding
is now truly open for reconsideration. Two federal judges have held
that the express advocacy standard is not an immutable constitutional
mandate, but merely the Supreme Court's effort to address the fail-
ure of Congress in the early 1970s to define the meaning of expendi-
ture. In their view, "express advocacy" is no more than the Supreme
Court's "first cut" at a definition of election-related communications
undertaken well before the proliferation of new forms of campaign
advertising that avoid the "magic words" and mock FECA's disclosure
requirements and restrictions on corporate and union treasury funds.
The real question for them was whether Congress had crafted a defi-
nition of electioneering communication which, in light of current
campaign practices and the goals of campaign finance law, is as clear
and narrowly tailored as First Amendment principles require. This is
not to say, of course, that either of BCRA's tests will pass constitu-
tional muster. Only one judge voted to uphold either the sixty-
/thirty-day rule or the backup test as written by Congress. While two
judges endorsed the backup definition as rewritten by Judge Leon,
his test seems open to both vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
Still, the three-judge court's decision provides some basis for thinking
that the Supreme Court may undertake a new effort to reconcile the
competing goals of effective campaign finance regulation and the
protection of nonelection-related speech, or else the Court will have
to explain why the clearly useless "express advocacy" test continues to
be required.
As for soft money, the three-judge court's decision sounds a warn-
ing to reformers not to assume that the soft money restrictions will
automatically be saved by the contributions standard of review. Judge
Henderson rejected that standard while Judge Leon, who claimed to
be applying it, found that the government had failed to produce suf-
ficient evidence that contributions given to the parties for activities
not coordinated with or linked exclusively to federal candidates are a
source of "corruption or the appearance of corruption" in the Buckley
sense.129 Given the lack of a unified set of findings, and hundreds of
pages of conflicting findings, a central issue for the Court will be the
question of whether soft money presents the corruption danger. This
is, in part, an empirical question, involving an assessment of the evi-
dence in the record of just how much of an impact these expendi-
129 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 389-94 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 758-90 (Leon,J.).
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tures have on federal elections, and how much of an impact the pur-
suit of soft money contributions has on governance. But, perhaps
more importantly, this will involve a determination of just how much
credit the Court will give to Congress's assessment of the electoral
and political consequences of soft money and soft-money-funded ex-
penditures. Congress clearly has far greater experience with and un-
derstanding of the role of campaign money in electoral politics and
the legislative process than does the Court. Yet, relying on the First
Amendment concerns that infuse this area, the Court has never given
Congress carte blanche over campaign finance law.
Moreover, as Judge Leon emphasized, BCRA's soft money regula-
tions bear directly on the political parties. As the fragmented Colo-
rado Republican I and closely divided Colorado Republican II decisions
indicate, there is no clear consensus on the Court concerning the
constitutional rights of the political parties in the campaign finance
process. The parties have been treated by different justices as, vari-
ously, independent actors, close adjuncts of the candidates, potential
conduits for the contributions of large donors, and, as Judge Leon
suggested, especially valuable players in the political process. The
McConnell appeal will force the Court once again to come to grips
with the uncertain place of the parties in the campaign finance sys-
tem-and to consider the extent to which a Congress composed
overwhelmingly of party politicians and party leaders should decide
that question.
